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en vilo
Violencia policial
en protestas
de los chalecos
amarillos
Can
Erözden 06.03.2019
Unas
668 personas resultaron heridas por violencia policial desde el pasado mes de
noviembre durante las protestas de los chalecos amarillos, según informó este
martes Mediapart, un diario francés de investigación en línea.
Según
Mediapart, una persona murió y otras 368 resultaron heridas después de recibir
disparos de tanques de gas lacrimógeno de la Policía francesa durante las
protestas nacionales contra el gobierno de Emmanuel Macron.
La
violencia policial dejó 21 personas con lesiones en los ojos, 204 en la cabeza,
unas 68 con lesiones en las piernas, mientras que otras 41 resultaron heridas
en el pecho.
Entre
los heridos había 56 periodistas y 37 estudiantes de secundaria.
En
febrero, Dunja Mijatovic, comisionado del Consejo de Europa para los Derechos
Humanos, les pidió a las autoridades francesas que mostraran más respeto por
los derechos humanos durante las protestas. No obstante, el gobierno francés
defiende el uso de gases lacrimógenos por parte de la Policía para mantener el
orden público.
Desde
el 17 de noviembre, miles de manifestantes que vestían chalecos de color
amarillo brillante se han reunido en las principales ciudades francesas,
incluida París, para protestar por las controvertidas alzas del impuesto sobre
el combustible de Macron y el deterioro de la situación económica.
Según
las cifras del gobierno francés, 11 personas han muerto en las protestas y más
de 2.000 han resultado heridas.
El
ministro del Interior francés, Christophe Castaner, dijo en febrero que las
fuerzas de seguridad arrestaron a unas 8.400 personas.
Además,
al menos 1.796 personas más fueron condenadas a prisión.
Bajo
presión, Macron anunció un aumento en el salario mínimo y frenó los aumentos de
impuestos.
Sin
embargo, desde entonces las protestas se han convertido en un movimiento más
amplio dirigido a abordar la desigualdad en los ingresos y para pedir que los
ciudadanos tengan una voz más fuerte en la toma de decisiones del gobierno.
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Los 'chalecos
amarillos'
se juegan su futuro
en un marzo crucial
El movimiento pierde fuelle ante la
fragmentación,
la violencia y la estrategia de diálogo de
Macron
Las movilizaciones bajan de los
282.000 manifestantes de noviembre
a los 40.000 actuales
Andrea López-Tomàs
03/03/2019
La 16ª
semana consecutiva de movilizaciones de los chalecos
amarillos se vive con menos entusiasmo que nunca en el inicio de
un mes de marzo decisivo para Francia y para su presidente, Emmanuel
Macron. Casi 40.000 personas salieron a la calle este
sábado en todo el país para manifestarse una semana más, según cifras del Ministerio del Interior, frente
a los 282.000 manifestantes que tomaron Francia por
primera vez hace casi cuatro meses.
Las
reivindicaciones, iniciadas el pasado 17 de noviembre por la subida de los
precios del carburante, han perdido fuelle en las pasadas semanas.
En el último aliento de un movimiento que Macron está logrando apaciguar
públicamente con un proceso de diálogos con los franceses,
los chalecos amarillos han llamado a la movilización
masiva el próximo 16 de marzo en un intento de revitalizar el
movimiento.
El
presidente francés se apuntó un tanto en la guerra contra los chalecos cuando
el pasado 15 de enero convocó el "gran debate nacional" que, con el objetivo
de calmar la ira de los franceses, abrió procedimientos de reunión y
participación ciudadana sin precedentes en la historia del país.
Los chalecos amarillos han seguido saliendo a la calle cada
semana aunque las cifras de manifestantes han ido
disminuyendo.
Amarillo desgastado
Sus
chalecos se han ido destiñendo debido a la falta de concreción de sus
demandas, su violencia y agresividad y el aglutinamiento
de ideologías casi contrarias bajo el mismo color flúor. Las polémicas antisemitas que han azotado
al país también han salpicado a este movimiento que, cada vez más, se aleja de
la población francesa.
El movimiento ciudadano, desligado de sindicatos y formaciones políticas, explotó con la subida de los precios del carburante pero, en definitiva, fue una reacción a las políticas sociales y más de 30 millones de euros en pérdidas y 8.400 detenciones son el resultado de las movilizaciones económicas de Macron, acusado de ser el 'presidente de los ricos'. En noviembre, los chalecos amarillos se alzaron como el altavoz del pueblo francés pero ese concepto queda hoy muy lejos.
La repetida violencia hacia periodistas y
policías y los enfrentamientos con camioneros que se han cobrado varias
vidas han hecho perder legitimidad a las demandas de los chalecos
amarillos. Además, se estiman pérdidas de más de 30
millones de euros en todo el país, la mitad de ellos en París, desde
el inicio del conflicto y un total de 8.400 detenciones en
estos meses.
Deriva política
Por
otro lado, la falta de jerarquía en un movimiento sin claros
líderes ha facilitado el dominio de una minoría con una narrativa
radical que roza el extremismo. Poco tiempo tardó la líder del partido de
ultraderecha, Marine Le Pen, en usar el clima de inestabilidad y violencia en las calles para
atacar al actual presidente.
"En
el contexto de la sana revuelta de los chalecos amarillos, estas
elecciones serán la ocasión de resolver la crisis política nacida
de la ceguera, la intransigencia y el desprecio de clase, de
la expoliación fiscal y de la desconexión humana de un presidente molesto
por sus actitudes, preocupante por sus comportamientos, incompetente en
sus funciones", afirmó Le Pen en su acto de presentación para las elecciones europeas a
principios de enero.
Los
intentos de internacionalización de la causa también han
fracasado e incluso tuvieron que ver con la peor crisis diplomática entre Francia e Italia desde
la segunda guerra mundial. El apoyo entusiasta del Gobierno italiano a
los chalecos amarillos agotó la paciencia de Macron y el
Ejecutivo francés mandó un comunicado a principios de febrero advirtiendo
de que no iba a admitir injerencias en los asuntos domésticos.
Menos
apoyos
Más de
la mitad de la opinión pública francesa –el 56% según un sondeo reciente del Instituto Elabe-
consideran necesario abandonar el ritual de movilizaciones
semanales. Esas primeras demandas de mayor justicia fiscal o una mejora
del poder adquisitivo siguen recibiendo el apoyo de la población
francesa –un 58% cree en estas reivindicaciones-, pero las pérdidas
millonarias y la violencia que se repite cada semana quitan
lustro al movimiento.
La nueva
deriva política de los chalecos amarillos reclama la
supresión del Senado o el referéndum de iniciativa ciudadana. El anuncio de
una posible candidatura en las elecciones europeas del
próximo mayo hizo sonar las alarmas sobre el futuro del
movimiento, caracterizado inicialmente por las frustraciones económicas y
la desconfianza hacia las élites políticas y mediáticas.
Los
partidarios de dar el siguiente paso y organizarse políticamente se
toparon con las críticas de aquellos miembros del movimiento que
defendían el carácter social y de calle que lo ha
caracterizado. La heterogeneidad
en sus filas y en los diferentes territorios
refleja la clara división sociológica y geográfica que
caracteriza a Francia en la actualidad.
Marzo decisivo
El “gran debate nacional” iniciado por el
presidente francés el pasado 15 de enero ha supuesto una interacción
entre el Gobierno y el pueblo francés sin precedentes. Durante dos
meses, Macron ha intentado calmar la ira de los franceses
mediante la recopilación de quejas. El
resultado: unas 10.000 reuniones en Francia y más
de un millón de contribuciones en Internet.
El gran debate nacional ha
generado 10.000 reuniones y un millón de aportaciones en Internet
"Tenemos
que mantener la presión hasta el final del gran debate para
que el Gobierno nos haga el menor daño posible", afirmó el sábado el
manifestante Olivier Barba en la ciudad de Lille.
Los chalecos amarillos exigen una amplia movilización de
la población francesa el próximo 16 de marzo que marca el fin
del gran debate nacional de Macron y el cuarto mes de protestas.
"El
movimiento no se detendrá hasta que el Ejecutivo se de por vencido. No
nos dejan otra opción, no nos están escuchando", declaró Karine.
una asistenta materna en los suburbios de Burdeos, a AFP en las
manifestaciones del sábado. Las demandas frente a la desigualdad social
y fiscal en el estado francés siguen en boca de los manifestantes
aunque, al final, son los actos vandálicos y las voces radicales a
quienes se les dedican titulares y discursos.
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¿Por qué los chalecos amarillos
no benefician a la izquierda francesa?
Tres meses después de la emergencia de este singular
movimiento de protestas, apenas mejoran las perspectivas electorales de las
fuerzas progresistas. La Francia Insumisa de Mélenchon sufre una fuerte caída
en los sondeos.
Enric Bonet
Aumento
del salario mínimo, recuperación del Impuesto sobre la Fortuna (ISF), creación
de un Referéndum de Iniciativa Ciudadana (RIC)… Las principales
reivindicaciones de los “chalecos amarillos” están relacionadas con la justicia
social y una mayor participación democrática. Tres meses después de la emergencia
de este singular movimiento, que este fin de semana celebra su 14º acto de
protestas, las perspectivas electorales de las fuerzas progresistas francesas
no se han visto beneficiadas. Incluso la Francia Insumisa, que apoyó a los
“chalecos amarillos” desde las primeras manifestaciones del 17 de noviembre, ha
sufrido una fuerte caída en los sondeos.
Según
un reciente estudio de opinión para el diario Les Echos, el partido de
Jean-Luc Mélenchon —principal aliado de Podemos en Francia — solo obtendría el
8% de los votos en las próximas elecciones europeas. Un resultado muy por
debajo del esperanzador 19,58% logrado en las presidenciales de 2017. En este
mismo sondeo del instituto OpinionWay, el resto de partidos de la dividida
izquierda francesa aún salen peor parados. Los verdes franceses consiguen el
8%, los socialistas el 6%, el movimiento Génération·s de Benoît Hamon solo
alcanza el 4% y el histórico Partido Comunista cae al 2%, lo que le dejaría sin
representación en el Parlamento Europeo.
¿Por
qué los chalecos amarillos no benefician a los partidos progresistas franceses?
¿Cómo se explica que no mejoren las perspectivas electorales de la izquierda si
estas protestas han puesto en el centro de la agenda la injusticia social?
"Prolongación
institucional de las protestas"
Desde el 17 de noviembre, todos los
diputados de la Francia Insumisa apoyaron al movimiento. El
interés de la izquierda francesa por los chalecos amarillos no fue un romance a
primera vista. Después de semanas de dudas, en las que lo percibían como un
movimiento contra los impuestos, Mélenchon fue de los primeros dirigentes
insumisos que apoyaron las protestas. No solo le siguieron el resto de
dirigentes de la Francia Insumisa, sino que también simpatizaron con ellas, con
mayor o menor intensidad, las otras formaciones progresistas.
Cada sábado, en las rotondas y manifestaciones hay diputados y
militantes insumisos", asegura en declaraciones a Público Arthur
Meano, asistente parlamentario de la izquierda insumisa en la Asamblea
Nacional.
“La
Francia Insumisa considera que su estrategia populista se ha visto validada por
los chalecos amarillos, que reflejan la oposición entre el pueblo y las élites”,
explica Rémi Lefebvre, profesor de ciencias políticas en la Universidad de
Lille-2 y experto en la socialdemocracia francesa. De hecho, Mélenchon
considera que se trata de la “revolución ciudadana” que teorizó en su libro
L’ère du peuple (La era del pueblo).
“Se
trata de un momento que en contadas ocasiones vivimos a lo largo de una vida.
Sin predecir que nos llevará a una revolución, es evidente que se trata de un
momento revolucionario”, defendía el diputado insumiso Éric Coquerel, en una
entrevista para el semanario Politis.
Probablemente, sin la implicación de esta formación populista de izquierdas, la
Reagrupación Nacional de Marine Le Pen hubiera tenido una mayor influencia
entre los chalecos amarillos. “Mélenchon creía que había el riesgo de que el
movimiento fuera recuperado políticamente por la extrema derecha”, recuerda el
analista político Lenny Benbara, fundador del diario digital Le Vent se lève.
“Para llegar al 25% de los votos, la Francia Insumisa necesita seducir al
electorado popular que se siente identificado con los “chalecos amarillos”,
afirma Lefebvre.
Por
este motivo, los diputados insumisos han intentado “convertirse en la
prolongación institucional de estas protestas”, defiende Meano. El grupo
parlamentario de los insumisos presentó este miércoles 13 de febrero un
proyecto de ley para instaurar el Referéndum de Iniciativa (RIC), una de las
reivindicaciones más emblemáticas de los “chalecos amarillos”. Esta medida
permitiría organizar una consulta sobre una nueva legislación, derogar una
antigua o revocar el mandato de un representante electo a partir de 860.000 firmas.
Víctima
de la desconfianza hacia la izquierda
Aunque
esta propuesta tiene escasas posibilidades de prosperar, refleja las
similitudes programáticas entre los insumisos y los “chalecos amarillos”. Según
un sondeo reciente del instituto Elabe, el 28% de los franceses considera que
la Francia Insumisa es la formación que mejor representa las reivindicaciones
de las protestas, siendo este el primer partido citado.
El 70% de los franceses son partidarios
de recuperar el Impuesto sobre la Fortuna
Estas
protestas coinciden con un aparente giro hacia valores de “izquierdas” de la
opinión pública francesa. Según el barómetro anual que realiza el instituto
OpinionWay, el 69% de los franceses considera que hay que “tributar más a los
ricos para dar a los pobres”, catorce puntos más que el año pasado. El 65%
(nueve puntos más) piensa que hay que priorizar “la mejora de la situación de
los asalariados” en lugar de la “competitividad de las empresas”. Un sondeo
publicado en diciembre por el diario comunista L’Humanité indicaba que
el 70% de los franceses son partidarios de recuperar el Impuesto sobre la
Fortuna, que pagaban los patrimonios superiores a un millón de euros y que fue
suprimido parcialmente por el presidente francés, Emmanuel Macron.
A
pesar de que el anhelo por la justicia social crece entre los franceses, esto
no beneficia a los partidos progresistas. ¿Por qué? “Nosotros consideramos que
son valores de izquierdas, pero ellos (los “chalecos amarillos”) no, ya que
consideran que la izquierda no defiende la justicia social”, explica Lefebvre.
En
Francia, la palabra “izquierda” sigue siendo sinónima del decadente Partido
Socialista, defenestrado del poder tras el pobre mandato de François Hollande.
Sólo el 12% de los franceses confía en la izquierda para gobernar, según el
estudio de OpinionWay.
El 71%
asegura que no tiene confianza ni con la izquierda ni la derecha.“El éxito de
los chalecos amarillos —el único movimiento capaz de frenar las reformas de
Macron— ha reforzado la idea que los partidos de oposición son ineficaces y
aumentado el sentimiento de que no se ven representados por las fuerzas
institucionales”, explica Benbara. Según este joven analista político, la
debilidad de los principales opositores a Macron, como Mélenchon o Le Pen, favoreció
la emergencia de los “chalecos amarillos”. Y “su aparición se vio acelerada”
por la crisis interna de la Francia Insumisa, añade.
Divisiones
y liderazgo cuestionado
Además
de la difícil alianza entre los insumisos y los “chalecos amarillos”, la popularidad
de Mélenchon cayó tras el nefasto episodio del registro de la sede de su
partido. El pasado 16 de octubre, la policía judicial francesa realizó trece
inspecciones en la sede de esta formación y en los domicilios de sus
principales dirigentes. Unos 70 agentes participaron en esta espectacular
operación policial.
Pese
al carácter probablemente desproporcionado de estos registros, dadas las
investigaciones preliminares que afectan la Francia Insumisa sobre dos
presuntos casos de desvío de fondos públicos, la atención mediática estuvo
centrada en el comportamiento histriónico de Mélenchon. El líder de los
insumisos intentó entrar por la fuerza a las oficinas de su partido y gritó
delante de un agente de las fuerzas de seguridad: “La República, ¡soy yo! ¡Yo
soy parlamentario!”. “El principal motivo de la caída de la popularidad de los
insumisos se debe al episodio de los registros”, explica Benbara.
Desde
entonces, la figura de Mélenchon quedó debilitada. Su liderazgo se vio
cuestionado dentro de este movimiento político, dividido entre los partidarios
de una estrategia populista y soberanista y los que apuestan por aliarse con
otros sectores de la izquierda francesa. Además, la toma de decisiones en la
Francia Insumisa, a veces criticada por ser demasiado vertical, fue criticada
después de que en enero Mélenchon expulsara del partido a través de un tweet a
François Cocq, un influyente representante de la corriente soberanista.
“Cuando Mélenchon habla, Le Pen recoge
los frutos”
Tras
su apoyo a los chalecos amarillos, esta formación ha sufrido también duras
críticas de la prensa mainstream de coquetear con la ultraderecha. “En todos
los aspectos, somos lo contrario de la ultraderecha”, defiende Meano.
Aunque
los dirigentes insumisos se oponen a cualquier alianza con el partido de Le
Pen, el Journal du Dimanche, afín a Macron, realizó en enero un sondeo
preguntando a los franceses qué les parecería una alianza entre la Reagrupación
Nacional y la Francia Insumisa. Unos reproches de rojipardismos hechos por el mismo
Hamon. Este socialista disidente, que ahora impulsa el movimiento Génération·s,
considera que “cuando Mélenchon habla, Le Pen recoge los frutos”.
No
obstante, ninguna de las otras formaciones de izquierdas se ven beneficiadas
por la crisis de la Francia Insumisa. A diferencia de lo que sucede en
Alemania, las perspectivas de los verdes franceses resultan poco deslumbrantes.
Tanto los socialistas, comunistas o Génération·s de Hamon podrían quedarse
sin representación en el Parlamento Europeo al obtener menos del 5% de los
votos. La división de las fuerzas progresistas aún se ha visto acentuada
por la reciente aparición de un nuevo partido Place Publique (Plaza Pública),
formado por un grupo de mediáticos intelectuales, como Raphael Glucksmann (hijo
de André Glucksmann, miembro de los nouveau philosophes, de corte conservador)
o el economista Thomas
Porcher.
Si la
división es un obstáculo para la izquierda francesa, aún más importante es la
divergencia ideológica con los “chalecos amarillos”. Aunque este movimiento se
opone a la injusticia social, prefiere concentrar sus críticas en la figura de
Emmanuel Macron y los privilegios de los ricos, en lugar de los pequeños y
medios empresarios. No se trata de la tradicional lucha de clases. Su
reivindicación de una mejora del poder adquisitivo puede satisfacerse tanto a
través de una disminución de los impuestos como un incremento de los salarios.
Los manifestantes prefieren expresar su patriotismo ondeando la bandera
francesa, en lugar de mostrar su izquierdismo con estandartes rojos.
Dignidad,
equidad, patria, por un lado; justicia social, lucha de clases y socialismo,
por el otro. Dos campos semánticos parecidos, pero diferentes. Y el reto de la
izquierda francesa de construir el puente para llegar a la otra orilla del
descontento social.
revista anfibia
Decenas de miles de
franceses identificados con chalecos amarillos, por fuera de partidos y
sindicatos y con fronteras ideológicas difusas. Clima insurreccional, pero
cívico, con clases medias y trabajadores pobres movilizados contra las élites.
Políticos y analistas desorientados ¿hasta dónde están dispuestos a llegar los
manifestantes, que ya tienen el apoyo del 70% de la sociedad francesa.
Las
paradojas abundan: el presidente Emmanuel Macron, que llegó al Elíseo con 39
años convocando a los ciudadanos por encima y por fuera de los partidos y de la
izquierda y la derecha, solo un año y medio después es puesto contra las
cuerdas por un movimiento ciudadano sin líderes, por fuera de partidos y
sindicatos, y con fronteras ideológicas difusas. El líder de Francia Insumisa,
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, convocó una y otra vez a la “insumisión” pero esta
finalmente se produjo por fuera de cualquiera de los marcos históricos de la
izquierda tradicional. Y, finalmente, a la ultraderechista Marine Le Pen, que
siempre llamó a la rebelión de la France profonde contra las elites, el
motín amarillo la agarra tratando de refundar su partido, que pasó de llamarse
Frente a Reagrupamiento Nacional, para recuperars de la derrota electoral de
2017
La lista
de detenidos y procesados deja ver algunas características sociales del
movimiento: hombre jóvenes, de entre 20 y 40 años, con una profesión e insertos
en el mercado laboral, que pasaron la primera noche de su vida en prisión.
“¿Dónde están los casseurs (vándalos)? No acá”, titulaba el artículo el periódico Liberation
sobre los detenidos.
Sin
duda, entre los casseurs hay un poco de todo: militantes “autónomos”
atraídos por la estética de acción directa del movimiento, jóvenes de las banlieues
que aprovecharon para manifestarse en París, y auténticos gilets jaunes
que expresaban así su frustración. “Sin violencia nadie nos hubiera escuchado”,
reza el argumento más convincente en todo este asunto y muchos franceses
coinciden: más del 70% apoya las protestas.
Se
trata de un movimiento anti-élite y anti-ricos. “Por un presidente de los
pobres”, decía una de las pintadas que “vandalizaron” las paredes de la zona de
los campos Elíseos y el propio Arco de Triunfo (Macron es ampliamente
denunciado desde casi el inicio de su mandato como “presidente de los ricos”).
Cada vez más, las reivindicaciones se desplazan desde el tema inicial de las tasas
sobre los carburantes hacia el salario y el poder de compra. Pero el movimiento
no está acompañado por huelgas y paros laborales en las empresas. Los
sindicatos franceses, cada vez menos influyentes, parecen perplejos y
desubicados frente a este movimiento incontrolable e indescifrable, mientras
parte de su base simpatiza activamente con los manifestantes.
Como
señala el economista del INSEE (Instituto nacional de estadísticas) Jérome
Accardo, “la ausencia de huelgas constituye de hecho un indicio sociológico.
Las huelgas por el salario se desarrollan en las grandes empresas privadas,
donde hay muchos trabajadores y una relación de fuerzas favorable, suponiendo
también que el sindicato tome la iniciativa. Es lo mismo con los trabajadores
con contrato estable en el sector público. Pero no funciona en las pequeñas
empresas privadas, sea porque lo asalariados son demasiado débiles, sea porque
reina cierto ambiente de paternalismo y cercanía socio-cultural con el patrón,
o simplemente porque los trabajadores saben que la empresa es frágil y no hay
mucha margen de aumento que ganar. La misma cosa vale para los emprendimientos
y asociaciones del sector social y de salud, tipo auxiliares a domicilio, con
muchas mujeres que trabajan a tiempo parcial, con contratos precarios, etc. Y
por supuesto para los trabajadores independientes”. Conclusión: con ocho
millones de empleados en empresas con más de cincuenta empleados (es decir, con
un comité de empresa, sindicatos con representación oficial en ello, etc.) y
siete millones en PYME y microempresas, la ausencia de llamada a la huelga
entre los chalecos amarillos sugiere que estos siete millones de empleados de
las PYME y las microempresas están muy sobrerrepresentados en el
movimiento.
En
lugar de una clásica movilización obrera, se observa una especie de clima
insurreccional cívico-republicano de clases medias bajas y trabajadores pobres,
sobre todo del interior, movilizadas contra las élites a través de redes
sociales de características muy sui géneris. Hasta ahora, ha
desbordado las tentativas de infiltración e instrumentación
(inicialmente muy fuertes y con cierto éxito en algunos lugares puntuales)
de parte de la extrema derecha.
Más
allá de los temas redistributivos, hay una profunda exigencia de reconocimiento
social de parte de sectores que se sienten excluidos de la narrativa dominante
de los sectores urbanos privilegiados o bien insertados en el proceso de
globalización. Existe entre los gilets jaunes una suerte de
“economía moral” del mérito y del esfuerzo que expresa un sentido de dignidad
pero que, al mismo tiempo, podría ser instrumentalizada de maneras
ideológicamente muy diversas: por ejemplo, contra la asistencia social (se nota
toda una temática recurrente de crítica del “assistanat”), los
trabajadores “privilegiados” (como ferroviarios o maestros) o contra los pobres
que “no trabajan”. Pero pese a algunos deslices discursivos esporádicos, hasta
ahora ha funcionado más bien contra el desprecio social de la “casta” y la
meritocracia tecnocrático-neoliberal y ultra-arrogante encarnada por Macron.
La
consigna más pintada en las paredes es “Macron dimisión”. El presidente francés
logró ser más impopular que François Hollande y su proyecto de modernización
capitalista para hacer frente a la “decadencia” francesa junto con su estética
de presidente-monarca está hoy en cuestión.
Francia
es, más allá de la alternancia entre conservadores y socialdemócratas, un país
gobernado por una elite cerrada, surgida de la Escuela Nacional de
Administración (ENA) y la Escuela Politécnica. Un ejemplo de esta actitud puede
encontrarse en un discurso de Macron del año pasado, cuando al inaugurar una
estación de trenes dijo: “Una estación es un lugar donde se cruza la gente
exitosa y los que no son nada (sí, “que ne sont rien”)”. “Macron escucha
pero no oye”, sintetizó un diputado opositor. Otro ejemplo: en un debate con
chalecos amarillos, una diputada confesó no saber el monto del salario mínimo,
uno de los ejes de las disputas. Los chalecos abandonaron, indignados, el
estudio de televisión.
Al
mismo tiempo, hay un ethos de “democracia directa” y una crítica a la
intermediación muy radical y muy fuerte en el movimiento, pero que no
tiene casi nada que ver con las tradiciones de la izquierda radical o del
anarquismo de los siglos XIX y XX, sino que expresa más bien una especie
de sinergia entre cierto igualitarismo republicano francés genérico (hay
muchas alusiones a 1789 en el movimiento, pero nunca a la Comuna de París)
y la cultura horizontal de las redes sociales.
Los gilets
jaunes pusieron en la agenda un debate sobre los impuestos en un contexto
en el que Macron eliminó el impuesto solidario sobre las fortunas (ISF) y subió
los impuestos indirectos. “La crisis de los gilets jaunes pone a Francia
y Europa frente a una cuestión central: la justicia tributaria”, escribió el
economista Thomas Piketty.
Para
el autor de El capital en siglo XXI, Macron se equivoca de época. “Desde
la crisis de 2008, y especialmente desde Trump, Brexit y la explosión del voto
xenófobo en toda Europa, muchos han comprendido mejor los peligros planteados
por el aumento de las desigualdades y el sentimiento de abandono de las clases
trabajadoras, y es bien conocida la necesidad de una nueva regulación social
del capitalismo. En estas condiciones, tomar otra vez medidas a favor de los
más ricos en 2018 no fue muy inteligente. Si Macron quiere ser el presidente de
los años 2020 y no de los ‘90, tendrá que adaptarse rápidamente”.
También
está en discusión quién paga la transición ecológica. La Francia del automóvil
frente a la Francia del monopatín: hay una sociología de la movilidad detrás de
la rebelión amarilla. La Francia del interior necesita el automóvil para la
vida cotidiana (ir al trabajo, llevar a los hijos a la escuela…) a diferencia
de los sectores urbanos que se mueven en metro, bicicleta o
monopatines…públicos. “Ellos hablan del fin del mundo (por la crisis
ecológica), nosotros del fin de mes” –decía uno de los carteles.
Sin
embargo, la entrada al juego de estudiantes secundarios, sectores urbanos y
militantes de izquierda ha impedido -hasta ahora- una deriva trumpiana de estas
cuestiones. Sorprendentemente, la marcha por el clima del 8 de diciembre, en el
marco de la COP 24 que se celebra en Polonia, tendió puentes y lazos solidarios
con los chalecos amarillos. “No a la ecología sin justicia social” fue la
consigna-puente entre ambos “mundos”. “Los gilets jaunes nos muestran el
camino”.
“El
clima y la justicia social son dos causas relacionadas”, explicaba a Mediapart un
ingeniero de 29 años. Y apuntaba: “En Angoulême (donde vive) todos necesitamos
un coche. En la periferia, todos los servicios gubernamentales se están
desmoronando. Los puestos y las salas de maternidad están cerrando. La gente se
ve obligada a usar sus autos para llegar allí. No es una elección”. Caminaba
por el clima con un chaleco amarillo para mostrar su solidaridad con el
movimiento.
Algunos
chalecos amarillos hablan de presentar una lista propia — “ni de derecha
ni de izquierda” – en las elecciones europeas, lo que por supuesto puede
evocar la dinámica italiana, de derecha pero parece difícil que logren consenso
y representatividad para esto en un movimiento tan celoso de la autonomía y
descentralización de sus bases.
Entre
los 40 puntos que circulan como propuesta de plataforma de un sector de los
chalecos, se plantea una democratización del sistema político mediante la
convocatoria a una Asamblea Constituyente ciudadana, la eliminación del senado
y un sistema proporcional de elección de diputados. Y los temas de migración no
han escalado al primer plano como querría la extrema derecha.
Como
decía un editorial de la revista Mediapart, el movimiento de los
“chalecos amarillos” escapa a las interpretaciones preconcebidas de los
políticos y editorialistas de los medios. Nadie puede anticipar lo que sucederá
con la movilización más escurridiza en décadas.
European Parliament elections :
new responses in dangerous times
5th March 2019
The European Parliament elections could see the emergence
of a large populist bloc thwarting progress for the next five years.
A big mobilisation is needed to prevent that.
The elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 will be like no previous European elections—possibly the most important since the first direct elections 40 years ago.
The major fear is of a new parliament severely disrupted by a big increase in extreme nationalist and anti-European MEPs. It means that all democrats, including but not only candidates and parties, have to be crystal-clear on one thing throughout the elections: extreme nationalists and anti-Europeans have nothing whatsoever to offer.
The challenges facing us today are enormous. Whether tackling climate change and pollution, growing inequalities, the monopoly power or tax avoidance of multinationals, the management of digitalisation, fighting terrorism, cyber-crime or fake news, the solution lies in European countries working together as a powerful bloc through the union—not with each of the member states going their own way. We simply cannot afford to try to cope with these immense problems through purely national solutions. They are not enough.
While extremists will seek to divide us—creating division and pinning blame on migrants or refugees or so-called ‘Brussels bureaucrats’—we who believe in democracy must put forward a hopeful and more inclusive vision for the future of our countries, working together in Europe, and be able to make the decisions that need to be taken.
A new social contract
That is why the European Trade Union Confederation has published its programme for the European elections. In ‘A fairer Europe for workers’, we argue for tackling the big problems that we face, for a new social contract for Europe, based on democracy and social justice, quality jobs and higher wages, and socially just transitions to a low-carbon and digital economy in which no one is left behind.
The ETUC calls for a fairer and more equal society with real opportunities for all. For this we propose new economic policies, including fairer and progressive tax systems to redistribute the wealth we all help to generate. We argue for more public and private investment to boost growth that benefits everyone—not just a few.
We call for the right to quality education to be fully implemented, so that everyone can participate in the transition to a low-carbon and digital economy.
We call for strengthened democracy, including sound social dialogue and effective collective bargaining (embracing platform and self-employed workers), as well as more democratic participation in society and the workplace.
Deep scars
But our task is not limited to putting forward inspiring ideas for the Europe we want. The crisis has left deep scars on many citizens, many people’s wages are worth less than a decade ago and slow economic recovery has yet to benefit many workers. People fear that EU leaders are unable or unwilling to deliver solutions to the problems that matter to them. In short, there is a job to do to convince sceptical voters that positive change is possible.
The ETUC‘s election programme spells it out: the EU can be a force for good and positive change is possible. We have to persuade voters this is the case. Under strong pressure from trade unions and citizens, the EU did adopt a new investment programme and the European Pillar of Social Rights with new legislative initiatives to increase workers´ rights. These were important but tentative steps to putting the EU back on the right track—steps whose momentum must carry us much further.
We also need to make clear that democracy is at risk from extremists. This is to an extent we have not seen in much of western Europe since the 1930s, and since the fall of more recent dictatorships in southern and eastern Europe.
Bigger coalition
And there exists a specific problem to tackle. It is very likely that a new alliance of parties will be needed to form a democratic and pro-European majority in the European Parliament. The ‘grand coalition’ between the centre-right (EPP) and centre-left (S&D/PES) will almost certainly not be enough. All democratic forces—including the trade union movement and civil society—will need to put pressure on the democratic pro-European parties to create a new and bigger coalition to limit the influence of anti-Europeans and the extreme movements.
Otherwise we can forget about a more social and sustainable Europe, active on issues that matter for workers, for at least the next five years.
So we all need to get out there putting forward our ideas for the Europe we want, to persuade citizens to vote for democratic parties and candidates who want to work together for a better Europe for all citizens.
About Katja Lehto-Komulainen
Katja Lehto-Komulainen is deputy general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation. (ETUC) She was previously head of international affairs at the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK).
Democratising Europe :
by taxation or by debt?
11th February 2019
Europe desperately needs to resolve its collective-action problem
to emerge from the crisis.
Democratising Europe, with a fiscal capacity,
is better than monetary easing.
Thomas Piketty
On December 10th 2018 we launched a Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe (*) along with 120 European politicians and academics. Since it was launched, the manifesto has accrued over 110,000 signatures and it is still open for more. It includes a project for a treaty and a budget enabling the countries which so wish to set up a European Assembly and a genuine policy for fiscal, social and environmental justice in Europe—all available multilingually on the website.
In the Guardian, on December 13th, Yanis Varoufakis presented his ‘Green New Deal’ as an alternative to the manifesto, which he considers to be irrelevant. Concerned to ensure the quality of debate before the coming European elections, we set out some answers to his criticisms and clarify the differences between his plan and our proposals.
The Varoufakis plan builds on the European Investment Bank (EIB) which is responsible for issuing bonds to the value of €500 billion per annum, including these securities in the programme of purchase of securities by the European Central Bank (ECB). ‘They will sell like hot cakes,’ he says with the communicative enthusiasm which the former minister of finance in the Tsipras government in Greece is known to display for his own solutions.
What purpose would the funds thus raised serve—the ecological reconversion of the European economy, whence the slogan ‘New Green Deal? We have no intention to criticise this aim. The reconversion of our system of growth towards a sustainable economic regime is an absolute necessity today. It should be implemented at European level and indeed plays a central role in our own proposal.
What is the difference?
The main criticism by Varoufakis seems to be the following: why do you want to create yet more new taxes when one can create money? Our budget is indeed financed by taxation, whereas his plan is financed by public debt. In his proposals, private firms involved in the ecological transition borrow money from the ECB, after having been selected by the EIB. In fact, part of this arrangement already exists in the form of the Juncker plan. What Varoufakis adds is the purchase of securities by the ECB rather than by private investors.
In the first instance, our proposals are based on taxes because a major part of the expenditure which we propose is public expenditure: financing research in new technologies by universities and sharing the cost of migration among member countries are beyond the sphere of private firms. This is one of the fundamental differences between our proposals: we propose to give Europe the means to provide public goods to its citizens—including the campaign against global warming, but not uniquely.
Secondly, the new shared taxes we propose are aimed at reducing inequality within countries. There are rich Greeks who do not pay sufficient taxes and poor Germans who pay too much; our aim is to ensure greater participation by the richest, wherever they are, to the greater benefit of the poorer, whatever their country.
Varoufakis criticises us however for limiting transfers among countries associated with the new additional budget to 0.1 per cent of gross domestic product. We introduced this parameter to avoid the delusion of the ‘transfer union’ being once again aired as an excuse for doing nothing. If there is a consensus to increase the threshold to 0.5 per cent of GDP or more, and if Varoufakis knows a way of forcing the various countries to accept it, then we would be happy to support such a modification. But one can already achieve a lot by establishing more fiscal justice and reducing inequality within count
Technocracy to the aid of the climate?
Another major difference between our proposals is that we set ourselves the imperative of a legitimate, democratic framework. Not so with Varoufakis. By radically shifting the decision-making centre of European economic policy towards the central bankers of the ECB, Varoufakis does not seem to be as concerned as he previously was by the fact that high-ranking civil servants will take decisions behind closed doors which affect millions of European citizens. The Varoufakis plan hands the reins of European policy to an uncontrolled technocracy, as if he had not drawn all the consequences from the Greek crisis!
In contrast, our manifesto takes into consideration the lessons of the present day. It does not build on the hypothetical ecological awareness of central bankers. Our intention is to anchor the reorientation of European policies in a new, stable, institutional and democratic architecture; this will enable the intervention of actors who to date have been marginalised in arrangements not clearly defined, so as to change the balance of power at the centre of Europe.
The policies carried out at European level by ministers of finance lack legitimacy, among other things.
To be legitimate, these European policies, which now intervene at the core of the social pacts of states, should be initiated and controlled by an assembly comprising European parliamentarians and, above all, nationally elected members, who, in the last resort, remain the guarantors of these pacts within our democracies.
To act as if everything could be settled by the issuance of a debt and to deem as negligible the question of fiscal justice and the democratic legitimacy of decisions concerning political economy, while restricting oneself to the eurozone, do not seem very convincing to us. That being said, we fully agree that our project would gain from being extended in many directions, in particular in matters of currency and debt.
The treaty we propose does indeed provide for the possibility of a sharing of debts above 60 per cent of GDP and would enable better democratic supervision of the ECB, thanks to the approval and examination of its senior staff by the European Assembly. But these parts of the treaty would gain from being aired and Varoufakis is right to stress the potential importance of the EIB and ECB in any credible strategy of ecological transition.
Financing the ecological transition
The Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe enables states who so wish to sign a treaty creating a new European Assembly—20 per cent European elected members and 80 per cent nationally elected—which would raise new taxes such as on the profits of major firms or the wealth of the richest European citizens. This would ensure that those who have gained from the construction of Europe participate in the financing of European public goods, for example the ecological transition and the reception and integration of migrants.
And provided that the states brought together represent at least 70 per cent of EU population, the European Assembly would take up the task to democratically control and direct the economic policies carried out by the ministers of finance of the states which made it up.
On these issues, it is very difficult to predict the transnational majorities which might emerge in the assembly. There is nothing for example to indicate whether the social fractions of the major European Christian-democrat parties would, or would not, side with left-wing parties to guarantee more social justice in our European societies—currently under threat everywhere from populist forces.
In conclusion, while they have the great merit of existing, the criticisms and proposals of Yanis Varoufakis do not seem to us to be in keeping with the issues at stake. Europe cannot ignore the questions of genuine democratic legitimacy and fiscal justice.
About Manon Boujou, Lucas Chancel, Anne-Laure Delatte, Thomas Piketty, Guillaume Sacriste, Stéphanie Hennette and Antoine Vauchez :
Manon Bouju is an economist. Lucas Chancel is vice-président of the World Inquality Lab, Paris School of Economics. Anne-Laure Delatte is an economist and CNRS research fellow. Stephanie Hennette-Vauchez is a jurist and professor at Paris Nanterre University. Thomas Piketty is an economist and professor at Paris School of Economics and at the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. Guillaume Sacriste is a political scientist and lecturer at Pantheon-Sorbonne University, Paris. Antoine Vauchez is a political scientist and CNRS research professor at Pantheon-Sorbonne.
(*) reproducido en nuestro boletín número 2
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Our plan to revive Europe can succeed where Macron and Piketty failed
Under a Green New Deal,
€500bn a year can be created without raising taxes –
and it may tempt Britain back to the fold
Last modified on Fri 14 Dec 2018
‘Historians will mark Emmanuel Macron’s failed reform agenda
as a turning point in the EU, perhaps one that is more significant than Brexit.’
If Brexit demonstrates that leaving the EU is not the walk in the park that Eurosceptics promised, Emmanuel Macron’s current predicament proves that blind European loyalism is, similarly, untenable. The reason is that the EU’s architecture is equally difficult to deconstruct, sustain and reform.
While Britain’s political class is, rightly, in the spotlight for having made a mess of Brexit, the EU’s establishment is in a similar bind over its colossal failure to civilise the eurozone – with the rise of the xenophobic right the hideous result.
Macron was the European establishment’s last hope. As a presidential candidate, he explicitly recognised that “if we don’t move forward, we are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone”, the penultimate step before dismantling of the EU itself. Never shy of offering details, Macron defined a minimalist reform agenda for saving the European project: a common bank deposit insurance scheme (to end the chronic doom loop between insolvent banks and states); a well-funded common treasury (to fund pan-European investment and unemployment benefits); and a hybrid parliament (comprising national and European members of parliament to lend democratic legitimacy to all of the above).
Since his election, the French president has attempted a two-phase strategy: “Germanise” France’s labour market and national budget (essentially making it easier for employers to fire workers while ushering in additional austerity) so that, in the second phase, he might convince Angela Merkel to persuade the German political class to sign up to his minimalist eurozone reform agenda. It was a spectacular miscalculation – perhaps greater than Theresa May’s error in accepting the EU’s two-phase approach to Brexit negotiations.
When Berlin gets what it wants in the first phase of any negotiation, German chancellors then prove either unwilling or incapable of conceding anything of substance in the second phase. Thus, just like May ending up with nothing tangible in the second phase (the political declaration) by which to compensate her constituents for everything she gave up in the first phase (the withdrawal agreement), so Macron saw his eurozone reform agenda evaporate once he had attempted to Germanise France’s labour and national budget. The subsequent fall from grace, at the hands of the offspring of his austerity drive – the gilets jaunes movement – was inevitable.
The great advantage of our Green New Deal is we are taking a leaf out of Franklin Roosevelt’s original New Deal in the 1930s.
Historians will mark Macron’s failure as a turning point in the EU, perhaps one that is more significant than Brexit: it puts an end to the French ambition for a fiscal union with Germany. We can already see the decline of this French reformist ambition in the shape of the latest manifesto for saving Europe by the economist Thomas Piketty and his supporters – published this week. Professor Piketty has been active in producing eurozone reform agendas for a number of years – an earlier manifesto was produced in 2014. It is, therefore, interesting to observe the effect of recent European developments on his proposals.
In 2014, Piketty put forward three main proposals: a common eurozone budget funded by harmonised corporate taxes to be transferred to poorer countries in the form of investment, research and social spending; the pooling of public debt, which would mean the likes of Germany and Holland helping Italy, Greece and others in a similar situation to bring down their debt; and a hybrid parliamentary chamber. In short, something similar to Macron’s now shunned European agenda.
Four years later, the latest Piketty manifesto retains a hybrid parliamentary chamber, but forfeits any Europeanist ambition – all proposals for debt pooling, risk sharing and fiscal transfers have been dropped. Instead, it suggests that national governments agree to raise €800bn (or 4% of EU GDP) through a harmonised corporate tax rate of 37%, an increased income tax rate for the top 1%, a new wealth tax for those with more than €1m in assets, and a C02 emissions tax of €30 per tonne. This money would then be spent within each nation-state that collected it – with next to no transfers across countries. But, if national money is to be raised and spent domestically, what is the point of another supranational parliamentary chamber?
Europe is weighed down by overgrown, quasi-insolvent banks, fiscally stressed states, irate German savers crushed by negative interest rates, and whole populations immersed in permanent depression: these are all symptoms of a decade-long financial crisis that has produced a mountain of savings sitting alongside a mountain of debts.
The intention of taxing the rich and the polluters to fund innovation, migrants and the green transition is admirable. But it is insufficient to tackle Europe’s particular crisis.
What Europe needs is a Green New Deal – this is what Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 – which I co-founded – and our European Spring alliance will be taking to voters in the European parliament elections next summer.
The great advantage of our Green New Deal is that we are taking a leaf out of US President Franklin Roosevelt’s original New Deal in the 1930s: our idea is to create €500bn every year in the green transition across Europe, without a euro in new taxes.
Here’s how it would work: the European Investment Bank (EIB) issues bonds of that value with the European Central Bank standing by, ready to purchase as many of them as necessary in the secondary markets. The EIB bonds will undoubtedly sell like hot cakes in a market desperate for a safe asset. Thus, the excess liquidity that keeps interest rates negative, crushing German pension funds, is soaked up and the Green New Deal is fully funded.
Once hope in a Europe of shared, green prosperity is restored, it will be possible to have the necessary debate on new pan-European taxes on C02, the rich, big tech and so on – as well as settling the democratic constitution Europe deserves.
Perhaps our Green New Deal may even create the climate for a second UK referendum, so that the people of Britain can choose to rejoin a better, fairer, greener, democratic EU.
• Yanis Varoufakis is the co-founder of DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe Movement) and former Greece finance minister
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Where the ‘Piketty plan’ is mistaken
28th February 2019
Stuart Holland argues that what Europe needs urgently
is not new institutions, as recommended by Thomas Piketty and others, but a Green New Deal.
In December Thomas Piketty and several others launched a Manifesto for the Democratisation of Europe, supported by 120 European politicians and academics, including proposals for a new European Union treaty, a new assembly and new European taxation. Since it was launched, the manifesto has gained over 110,000 signatures. In an article in the Guardian, Yanis Varoufakis countered this with the proposal from DiEM25, with which he is prominently associated, for a bond-funded Green New Deal. Piketty has responded in turn but both misunderstands and misrepresents the proposal.
A Green New Deal has been advanced not only by DiEM25 but also by the European Greens, which have made it the basis of their two last campaigns for the European Parliament. Its rationale is based on successive versions of A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Eurozone Crisis by Varoufakis and myself, in 2010, 2011 and 2012, and another with James Galbraith in 2013.
Piketty recognises that the Green New Deal proposition includes European Investment Bank (EIB) bonds, and that these could support ‘an ecological reconstruction of Europe’. But he claims that part of this is already in the Juncker plan for a European Fund for Strategic Investments, which is wrong.
The Juncker plan has entailed only €5 billion of EIB funds—rather than the €300 billion which Juncker made the first of ten commitments to the European Parliament, at the time of his adoption as commission president, or the €500 billion in the DiEM25 proposal, to which Varoufakis referred in the Guardian. It has also recently been strongly criticised by the EU Court of Auditors, for recycling existing funds rather than creating new resources.
While Piketty refers to EIB bonds in the DiEM25 New Deal proposal, he takes no account of the argument integral to it for bonds issued by the European Investment Fund (EIF). On my recommendation, the then commission president, Jacques Delors, embodied this in the commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment of December 1993 and persuaded the European Council to endorse it in 1994.
Eurobonds
The aim was to complement EIB micro-level project bonds with a macro-role for eurobonds to recycle surpluses in under-invested global pension and sovereign-wealth funds. Emmanuel Macron grasped this in 2014, as French economy minister, proposing to increase the subscribed capital of the EIF so that it could recycle a share of such surpluses to generate €200 billion or more of counterpart funds for EIB investments. At the time, he was opposed by the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, but Schäuble is no longer in office.
Piketty also neglects the fact that the Modest Proposal and its derivative case for a Green New Deal include more than funding environmental safeguards and green technology. Thanks to Antonio Guterres, when heading the government of Portugal, the Amsterdam Special Action Programme, endorsed by the European Council in 1997, persuaded the EIB to commit to this but also to fund investments in health, education, urban regeneration and venture capital for small and medium-sized firms to sustain innovative start-ups. These enabled it to quadruple its investment finance to more than double that of the World Bank in the following decade.
This fell to only some €60 billion after the 2008 financial crisis. Yet now, if quadrupled again—not least with EIF co-financing—it could reach some €240 billion, with investment multipliers of 2.5 to 3 double or more than fiscal multipliers, aided also by the EIF having become since 2000 part of the EIB Group.
Serviced by revenues
Unlike the Piketty proposals, none of this depends on a new treaty, a new assembly or new federal taxation—nor on national guarantees of eurobonds for a Green New Deal. For, although Piketty does not cite this, EIB bonds do not count on the national debt of EU member states any more than US Treasury bonds count on the debt of member states of the American union such as California or Delaware. Further, EIB Group bond finance does not depend on fiscal federalism, since it is serviced by revenues from the projects which it funds.
A real gain from EIB bond funding for public investment not counting on national debt is that this releases a major share of annual national taxation for current expenditures—such as raising minimum wages or increasing pensions, or both, without thereby increasing national debt or deficits. This has been integral to the successive versions of the Modest Proposal rationale for a European New Deal.
In claiming to highlight differences between his own proposals and those for a Green New Deal, Piketty claims that his are based on taxes because a major part of the public expenditure he proposes would finance research in new technologies by universities. This fails to appreciate that the key issue is not pure research but, as Mazzucato has evidenced, achieving synergies with entrepreneurship, which was already integral to the rationale for the EIF to issue venture capital.
Another difference claimed by Piketty between his proposals and those for a Green New Deal is ‘to provide public goods to citizens’.
Yet, thanks to Guterres, since 1997 the EIB has been doing this in funding investment in health, education, urban regeneration and the environment, without this adding to national debt. Moreover, the Lisbon Agenda of 2000, also cited in the Modest Proposal, was concerned not only with public goods but also public rights, endorsing the principle of the right to a work-life balance which most EU member states thereafter adopted in national legislation—even if this would have been better as a European citizenship right, as originally proposed by Guterres to the European Council.
A further wrong claim by Piketty is that Varoufakis’aim is ‘radically shifting the decision-making centre of European economic policy towards the central bankers of the ECB’. This is a distortion of the point, referred to by Varoufakis in his Guardian article, and also in the Modest Proposal, that the European Central Bank could buy EIB bonds on the secondary market to support their credibility—but this is secondary to the main case we have made since 2010 for both EIB and EIF bonds (not the ECB) to fund a New Deal.
Real difference
While Piketty is concerned to highlight differences between his proposals and those for a Green New Deal, the real difference between them is that his—however well-intentioned—are a wish list for a new treaty, a new institution and taxation of wealth and income. A Green New Deal needs neither treaty revisions nor new institutions and would generate both income and direct and indirect taxation from a recovery of employment.
It is grounded in the precedent of the success of the bond-funded, Roosevelt New Deal which, from 1933 to 1941, reduced unemployment from over a fifth to less than a tenth, with an average annual fiscal deficit of only 3 per cent. Thereby, Americans recovered faith in their institutions, which—whether in the outcome of the ‘Brexit’ referendum in the UK or the gilets jaunes protests in France—is transparently not the case now in the EU.
About Stuart Holland
Stuart Holland was Labour MP for Vauxhall 1979-89 and then an adviser to Jacques Delors and Antonio Guterres. His Beyond Austerity: Democratic Alternatives for Europe is available as an e-book from Spokesman Press.
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Financing the Green New Deal in Europe
28th February 2019
Should investment in a New Deal for Europe
come from taxation or borrowing?
Only the latter makes economic and political sense,
argues James K Galbraith.
Thomas Piketty and several colleagues have taken a shot at the European New Deal (END) of the Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25). Writing for DiEM25 last December, Yanis Varoufakis had noted how the taxes and spending Piketty advocates would now be implemented by each EU member individually with practically no Europe-wide component, a retreat from a previous agenda. So part of the difference between the two camps is over whether European green investment should be a continental project or merely each country doing what it chooses, more or less on its own.
But now Piketty calls attention to another big difference. The END of DiEM25 proposes to fund half a trillion euro of energy transformation and conservation with bonds—in other words, a policy of fiscal expansion backstopped by the European Central Bank. Piketty’s team proposes a series of tax measures, on corporate profits, a new progressive income-tax rate and an annual tax on wealth over one million euro—as well as a regressive carbon-emissions tax.
Overall, the Piketty proposal aims to redistribute 2 per cent of European gross domestic product (within countries, not between them) and to invest another 2 per cent in the Green New Deal, a number which comes to nearly €400 billion—close in principle to the DiEM25 proposal. In practice it would fall far short, since the taxes could not be imposed without national consent, and it would not only be tax havens such as Ireland and Luxembourg which would hold back. No conservative government in thrall to the wealthy would participate. Nor would any government that feared an insurrection such as that of the gilets jaunes.
The DiEM25 plan avoids this problem by promising to launch a green-investment programme without new taxes. But can one do this? Piketty and his colleagues say no. They want new taxes, ‘because a major part of the expenditure we propose is public expenditure’. They thus argue that one can’t have a Green New Deal without first putting up the taxes to ‘pay for it’.
Borrowing makes sense
But there is no requirement that any expenditure, whether public or private, be funded in advance by revenues. Expenditures in the nature of investments should, generally, not be funded in advance. If your house has a mortgage, you borrowed to pay for it.
If you start a new business, you usually borrow the capital to get started. If a big corporation decides to build a new factory, it too borrows, from a bank or by issuing a bond. Borrowing makes sense when real resources are available and the benefits come over time. In making decisions to invest, governments have an extra advantage: they can write a cheque without having borrowed ‘in advance’. When the cheque is cashed, the recipient can (and often does) simply switch the proceeds for a bond; thus the ‘borrowing’ occurs after, not before, the project is launched.
Both sides agree that major investments are absolutely necessary to fight climate change and sustain high living standards. The question is: which approach would succeed? Piketty’s proposals would impose immediate hardship, through the carbon tax, in order to bring in funds in advance of the investments. By creating hardship, Piketty’s proposals would destroy the political basis for dealing with climate change at all—just as Emmanuel Macron’s diesel tax has already largely done in France. And, given non-compliance and tax evasion, it would probably fail to bring in the revenue anyway. To that extent, by placing taxes before spending, Piketty and his colleagues are promoting a fantasy.
For DiEM25, in contrast, progress would be evident at once and results would start coming in. The required resources would come by mobilising people who are currently unemployed (6.8 percent!) or underemployed (many more!) all across Europe. DiEM25’s proposal would reorganise existing economic activity, provide needed work and generate revenues over time to service the debts taken out at the beginning. Full employment, including a job guarantee, is integral to the European New Deal, both as economics and as the necessary politics of making it work.
A path charted
The DiEM25 proposal follows the path charted by the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt from 1933 to 1936. Using the technical expertise of the European Investment Bank, it would identify and plan out the large and small undertakings required to achieve the green-investment objectives. Using the credit of Europe, it would fund those projects for the long term at low interest rates. Using the power of the European Central Bank, it would ensure that the bonds were placed on favourab.
The final argument in the Piketty text is that Varoufakis—a former Greek finance minister with scars to prove it—is now willing to turn European politics over to the ECB. The opposite is the truth. Under the DiEM25 proposal, as in the original New Deal and the mobilisation for World War II, the central bank would become the servant, not the master, of the public purpose.
About James K Galbraith
James K Galbraith teaches at he University of Texas at Austin and is the author of Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice: The Destruction of Greece and the Future of Europe.
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“New” Perspectives For Europe
22nd October 2018
I am invited to talk about New Perspectives on Europe, but new ones fail me, and the Trumpian decay afflicting even the core of Europe makes me seriously question my old perspectives. Certainly, the risks associated with a significantly changed state of the world have penetrated public awareness and have altered perspectives on Europe. They have also directed the broader public’s attention to the global context in which the countries of Europe have more or less unquestioningly felt at home so far. The perception has grown within public opinion throughout the nations of Europe that new challenges affect each and every country in the same way and therefore could best be overcome together. That strengthens, indeed, a diffuse wish for a politically effective Europe.
So, today, the liberal political elites proclaim, louder than before, progress should be made in European co-operation in three key areas: Under the heading European foreign and defence policy, they demand a boost to the military self-assertiveness that would allow Europe “to step out of the shadows of the USA”; under the motto of a common European asylum policy, they further demand robust protection of Europe’s external borders and the establishment of dubious reception centres in North Africa; and, under the slogan “free trade”, they wish to pursue a common European trade policy in the Brexit negotiations as well as in the negotiations with Trump. It remains to be seen whether the European Commission, which is conducting these negotiations, has any success – and whether, should it fail, the common ground of EU governments simply crumbles away. That’s one, encouraging side of the equation. The other is that nation-state selfishness remains unbroken if not bolstered by misguided considerations of the new International of surging right-wing populism.
Nationalist short-termism
The hesitant progress of the talks on a common defence policy and on an asylum policy that, again and again, falls apart over the distribution question shows that governments give priority to their short-term national interests – and this all the more so, the more strongly they are exposed at home to the undertow of right-wing populism. In some countries there’s not even any tension left between empty pro-European declarations on the one hand and short-sighted, un-cooperative behaviour on the other. In Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, and now in Italy and pretty soon probably in Austria, this tension has evaporated in favour of an openly europhobic nationalism. That throws up two questions: How is it that, in the course of the last decade, the contradiction between residual pro-European lip-service and the actual blockade of the required cooperation has come to such a head? And why is the eurozone nevertheless still holding together when, in all countries, right-wing populist opposition to ”Brussels” is growing – and at the heart of Europe, i.e. in one of the six founding nations of the EEC, has even led to an alliance of right- and left-populists based on a shared anti-European programme?
In Germany the twin issues of immigration and asylum policy have since September 2015 dominated the media and pre-occupied public opinion to the detriment of anything else. This fact suggests a swift answer to the question about the decisive cause of the increasing wave of euroscepticism, and that suggestion may be supported by some evidence in a country which still suffers from the psycho-political divisions of an unequally reunited nation.
But, if you look at Europe as a whole and especially the eurozone in its entirety, growing immigration cannot be the primary explanation for the surge in right-wing populism. In other countries, the swing in public opinion developed far earlier and indeed in the wake of the controversial policy for overcoming a sovereign debt crisis brought on by the crisis in the banking sector. As we know, in Germany the AfD was initiated by a group of economists and business people around economics professor Bernd Lucke, that is by people who feared the snaring of a prosperous major exporter in the chains of a “debt union” and who set in train the broad-based and effective polemical campaign against the threat of mutualising debt. Last week the tenth anniversary of the insolvency of Lehmann Brothers recalled the arguments about the causes of the crisis – was it market failure or government failings? – and the policy of enforced internal devaluation. This debate was conducted in other eurozone member states with substantial impact on public opinion whereas here in Germany it was always played down by both the government and the press.
Germany alone
The predominantly critical voices in the international debate among economists, which were the voices of the Anglo-Saxon mainstream against the Schäuble- and Merkel-driven austerity policies, have been barely noted and appreciated by the business pages of the leading media in Germany, just as on their political pages the social and human costs that these policies have dished out – and by no means only in countries like Greece and Portugal – were more or less ignored. In some European regions the unemployment rate is still just below 20 percent while the youth jobless rate is almost twice as high. If we today are worried about democratic stability at home, we ought also to remember the fate of the so-called “bail-out countries”:
It is a scandal that in the unfinished house of the European Union such a draconian policy which impinged so deeply upon the social safety net of other nations was lacking even in basic legitimacy – at least according to our usual democratic standards. And this still sticks in the craw of Europe’s peoples. Given that within the EU public opinions on politics are formed exclusively within national borders and that these different public spheres are not yet readily available one for one another, contradictory crisis narratives have taken root in different eurozone countries during the past decade.
These narratives have deeply poisoned the political climate since each one draws exclusive attention to one’s own national fate and prevents that kind of mutual perspective-taking without which no understanding of and for another can be formed – let alone any feeling for the shared threats that afflict all of us equally and, above all, for the prospects of pro-active politics that can deal with common issues and only do so in a cooperative mode and mentality.
In Germany this type of self-absorption is mirrored in the selective awareness of the reasons for the lack of co-operative spirit in Europe. I am astonished about the chutzpah of the German government that believes it can win over partners when it comes to the policies that matter to us – refugees, defence, foreign and external trade – yet simultaneously stonewalls on the central question of completing EMU politically.
Within the EU, the inner circle of the member states of the EMU are so tightly dependent on each other that a core has crystallised, even if only for economic reasons. Therefore, the eurozone countries would, if I may say so, naturally offer themselves for acting as pace-makers in the process of further integration. On the other hand, however, this same group of countries suffers from a problem that threatens to damage the entire European Project: We, especially those of us in an economically booming Germany, are suppressing the simple fact that the euro was introduced with the expectation and political promise that living standards in all member states would converge – whereas, in fact, the complete opposite has come to pass.
We suppress the real reason for the lack of a co-operative spirit that is more urgent today than ever before – namely, the fact that no monetary union can in the long run survive in view of an ever-wider divergence in the performances of different national economies and thereby in the living standards of the population in different member states. Apart from the fact that, today, in the wake of an accelerated capitalistic modernisation, we have also to cope with unrest about profound social changes, I consider the anti-European feelings spread by both left- and right-wing populist movements not as a phenomenon which only mirrors the present kind of xenophobic nationalism.
These eurosceptic affects and attitudes have different roots that lie in the failure of the European process of integration itself; they emerged independent of the more recent populist inflammation of xenophobic reactions in the wake of immigration. In Italy, for example, euroscepticism provides the sole axis between a left and a right populism, i.e. between ideological camps that are deeply split when it comes to issues of “national identity”. Quite independently of the migration issue, euroscepticism can appeal to the realistic perception that the currency union no longer represents a ‘win-win’ for all members.
The south against the north of Europe and vice versa: Whilst the “losers” feel badly and unjustly treated, the “winners” ward off the feared demands of the opposing side.
“Social Europe publishes thought-provoking articles on the big political and economic issues of our time analysed from a European viewpoint. Indispensable reading”.
Macron plan
As it transpires, the rigid rules-based system imposed upon the eurozone member states, without creating compensatory competences and room for flexible joint conduct of affairs, is an arrangement to the advantage of the economically stronger members. Therefore, the real question to my mind does not arise from an undetermined either “for” or “against” Europe”. Underneath this crude polarisation of a “pro” or “con” which goes without any further differentiation, there remains among Europe’s supposed friends a tacit question which so far remains untouched even though it is the key fault-line – namely, whether a currency union operating under sub-optimal conditions should just be made “weatherproof” against the risk of further speculation, or whether we should hold fast to the broken promise about developing economic convergence in the euro area and therefore develop the monetary union into a pro-active and effective European political union.
This promise was once politically linked to the introduction of the EMU. In the proposed reforms from Emmanuel Macron both goals have equal value: On the one hand, progress towards safeguarding the euro with the aid of the well-known proposals for a banking union, a corresponding insolvency regime, a common deposit guarantee for savings and a European Monetary Fund democratically controlled at the EU level. Despite diffuse announcements it is well known that the German government has been blocking any further steps from being taken in this direction – and is resisting all this up to now.
But Macron is on the other hand also proposing the establishment of a eurozone budget and – under the heading “European minister of finance” – the creation of democratically-controlled competences for political action at the same level. For the European Union could gain political prowess and renewed popular support only by creating competences and a budget for implementing democratically legitimised programmes against further economic and social drifting apart among the member states.
Interestingly, this decisive alternative between the goal of stabilising the currency on the one hand and the further-reaching objective of policies aimed at containing and shrinking economic imbalances on the other hand has not yet been put on the table for a wide-ranging political discussion. There is no pro-European Left that comes out for the construction of a Euro Union which is able to play a role at the global level and, thereby, has in sight the far-reaching goals such as an effective clamping down on tax evasion and a far stricter regulation of financial markets. That way, European social democrats would first of all emancipate themselves from the convoluted liberal and neoliberal goals of a vague “centre”. The reason for the decline of social democratic parties is their lack of profile.
Nobody knows any longer what they’re needed for. For social democrats no longer dare to take in hand the systematic taming of capitalism at the very level at which deregulated markets get out of hand. In making this connection I’m not in particular concerned with the fate of a distinct family of parties – although we should always remember when talking about this that the fate of democracy in Germany is historically more tied up with that of the SPD than with any other political party. My general concern is with the unexplained phenomenon that the established political parties in Europe are unwilling to or fail to forge platforms upon which positions and options vital for the future of Europe are sufficiently differentiated. The upcoming European elections serve as an experimental design in this regard.
On one side, Emmanuel Macron, whose movement so far is not represented in the European Parliament, is trying to break up the current party groups so as to build a clearly recognisable pro-European faction. By contrast, all those groups currently represented in the Parliament, with the obvious exception of the anti-EU far right factions, are internally divided even below the actually required degree of differentiation. Not all the groups allow themselves such a widely-spread balancing act as the EPP which so far is clinging on to Orbán’s membership.
The mindset and conduct of the CSU-member Manfred Weber who is seeking to become president is typical of the wishi-washiness that goes with a totally ambiguous stance.
But there are similar splits running through the liberal, socialist and (not least) leftist groups. With regard to at least a lukewarm commitment to Europe, the Greens might share a more or less clear position. Thus, even inside the Parliament, which is supposed to create majorities for societal interests generalized across national borders, the European Project has obviously lost any sharper contours.
Caught in a trap
If you in the end ask me, not as a citizen but as an academic observer, what my overall assessment is today, I’ll have to admit to failing to see any encouraging trends right now. Certainly, economic interests are so unambiguous and, despite Brexit, as powerful as ever that the collapse of the eurozone is unlikely. That implies the answer to my second question: why the eurozone still clings together: Even for the protagonists of a northern euro the risks of separation from the south remain incalculable. And for the corresponding case of a southern state’s exit we have seen the test case of the current Italian government that, despite loud and clear declarations during the election campaign, has immediately relented; for one of the obvious consequences of leaving would be unsustainable debts.
On the other hand, this assessment is not very comforting either. Let’s face it: if the suspected link between the economic drifting apart of the eurozone member economies on the one hand and the strengthening of right-wing populism on the other hand in fact holds, then we’re sitting in a trap in which the necessary social and cultural preconditions for a vital and safe democracy face further damage. This negative scenario naturally cannot count for more than just that. But already common-sense experience tells us that the European integration process is on a dangerous downward curve. You only recognise the point of no return when it’s too late. We can only hope that the rejection of Macron’s proposed reforms by the German government has not been the last lost opportunity.
This text is an abridged version of a speech given at a conference on “New Perspectives for Europe” at Humanities College, Goethe University (Frankfurt), in Bad Homburg (21 September 2018). Translated by David Gow.
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Beyond GDP
7th January 2019
GDP figures are often in the public eye
but they are insufficient measures for well-being.
Economics Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz
explains why we need to look beyond GDP.
Just under ten years ago, the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress issued its report, Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up.The title summed it up: GDP is not a good measure of wellbeing. What we measure affects what we do, and if we measure the wrong thing, we will do the wrong thing. If we focus only on material wellbeing – on, say, the production of goods, rather than on health, education, and the environment – we become distorted in the same way that these measures are distorted; we become more materialistic.
We were more than pleased with the reception of our report, which spurred an international movement of academics, civil society, and governments to construct and employ metrics that reflected a broader conception of wellbeing. The OECD has constructed a Better Life Index, containing a range of metrics that better reflect what constitutes and leads to wellbeing. It also supported a successor to the Commission, the High Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Last week, at the OECD’s sixth World Forum on Statistics, Knowledge, and Policy in Incheon, South Korea, the Group issued its report, Beyond GDP: Measuring What Counts for Economic and Social Performance.
The new report highlights several topics, like trust and insecurity, which had been only briefly addressed by Mismeasuring Our Lives, and explores several others, like inequality and sustainability, more deeply. And it explains how inadequate metrics have led to deficient policies in many areas. Better indicators would have revealed the highly negative and possibly long-lasting effects of the deep post-2008 downturn on productivity and wellbeing, in which case policymakers might not have been so enamored of austerity, which lowered fiscal deficits, but reduced national wealth, properly measured, even more.
Political outcomes in the United States and many other countries in recent years have reflected the state of insecurity in which many ordinary citizens live, and to which GDP pays scant attention. A range of policies focused narrowly on GDP and fiscal prudence has fueled this insecurity.
Consider the effects of pension “reforms” that force individuals to bear more risk, or of labor-market “reforms” that, in the name of boosting “flexibility,” weaken workers’ bargaining position by giving employers more freedom to fire them, leading in turn to lower wages and more insecurity.
Better metrics would, at the minimum, weigh these costs against the benefits, possibly compelling policymakers to accompany such changes with others that enhance security and equality.
Spurred on by Scotland, a small group of countries has now formed the Wellbeing Economy Alliance. The hope is that governments putting wellbeing at the center of their agenda will redirect their budgets accordingly. For example, a New Zealand government focused on wellbeing would direct more of its attention and resources to childhood poverty.
Better metrics would also become an important diagnostic tool, helping countries both identify problems before matters spiral out of control and select the right tools to address them. Had the US, for example, focused more on health, rather than just on GDP, the decline in life expectancy among those without a college education, and especially among those in America’s deindustrialized regions, would have been apparent years ago.
Likewise, metrics of equality of opportunity have only recently exposed the hypocrisy of America’s claim to be a land of opportunity: Yes, anyone can get ahead, so long as they are born of rich, white parents. The data reveal that the US is riddled with so-called inequality traps: Those born at the bottom are likely to remain there. If we are to eliminate these inequality traps, we first have to know that they exist, and then ascertain what creates and sustains them.
A little more than a quarter-century ago, US President Bill Clinton ran on a platform of “putting people first.” It is remarkable how difficult it is to do that, even in a democracy. Corporate and other special interests always seek to ensure that their interests come first. The massive US tax cut enacted by the Trump administration at this time last year is an example, par excellence. Ordinary people – the dwindling but still vast middle class – must bear a tax increase, and millions will lose health insurance, in order to finance a tax cut for billionaires and corporations.
If we want to put people first, we have to know what matters to them, what improves their wellbeing, and how we can supply more of whatever that is. The Beyond GDP measurement agenda will continue to play a critical role in helping us achieve these crucial goals.
About Joseph Stiglitz
Joseph Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University
and a Nobel laureate in Economics.
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Could the dollar be in default?
7th March 2019
The US has been able to run growing budget deficits
by issuing more dollars as the reserve currency.
If a polycentric world ends its indulgence,
the shock to America could be great.
In 1944, at the end of World War II, a new international monetary system was agreed. This system pegged currencies to the price of gold, and the United States dollar was considered a reserve currency linked to the price of gold and convertible into it.
In the 1960s, the US had high budgetary deficits due to the Vietnam war, deficits which were financed by issuing more dollars. With inflation on the rise and a gold run looming, as president Richard Nixon was obliged to devalue the dollar and end its convertibility. The dollar became a fiduciary currency.
The world has changed deeply over the last decades. For a long time, the political and economic system was dominated by the US, but this situation has evolved into a multilateral world in which other prominent actors have appeared.
The 1980s’ economic liberalism boosted growth at the same time as it created speculation and crisis. A very lax monetary and fiscal policy, as well as a cost of money close to zero, issued in the huge financial crisis of 2007. The main central banks were forced to pour astronomical amounts of liquidity into the market and cover governments’ deficits, resulting in highly indebted countries.
Except for a few years, the US has always run budget deficits which caused an increase in public debt. By the end of 2018 this amounted $21.9 trillion—105.4 per cent of annual gross domestic product. Donald Trump’s two years as president have seen the debt increase by two trillion. The forecasts for the coming years show that both deficit and debt will keep increasing.
Market confidence
Because the US is a very powerful economy and the dollar is the main international reserve currency, it has not been hard to finance its shortfalls. But how far can the US increase its debt without losing the confidence of the market? No theory determines the cap of a country’s public debt—it basically depends on the degree of confidence in the currency. In the European Union, for example, its member countries should not exceed public debt of 60 per cent of GDP but some surpass it substantially.
For the near future, important financial institutions foresee a new economic recession. If it happens, how would it affect the US economy and the dollar? Could it have difficulties with its current high debt? Could the American debt be in default? Technically this cannot be and politically it’s unthinkable: the US can always issue more dollars to pay off debts.
This situation would not however prevent loss of creditors’ trust and probably a downward spiral from the deficit to the issue of dollars, to higher interest rates, to more debt and so more deficit. If this were to happen, it would engender an immense psychological shock for the American population and for the world as well.
Central banks are far from having recovered the normalcy which prevailed before the 2007 crisis. If a new crisis arises, they will not be able to supply as much money and keep lowering the interest rate as they did.
In a world that has become multipolar, it is likely that the dollar will progressively cease to enjoy hegemony as the international reserve currency and the main currency for commercial transactions—and it will keep losing value. Consider that to have the same purchasing power of 100 dollars in 1913 would require 2,000 dollars today. Inflation and the continued issue of dollars are the two main reasons for this eroded value.
The US finds itself in a complex situation as it can’t continue indefinitely with a high budget deficit and increasing indebtedness. Inflation has always been a useful formula to reduce real debt but it can’t be applied on a large scale if the currency is not to be severely depreciated. Moreover, expecting that the US economy will grow indefinitely such as to solve the debt problem is a fantasy.
Huge dilemma
This creates a huge dilemma within the US Congress and government: whether to continue with a policy which allows issuing as many dollars as are needed to cover the deficit—an unsustainable solution in the medium term—or to make a thorough review of the budget to reduce the deficit.
The decision to diminish the deficit will not be taken voluntarily by Congress as it would be very controversial politically. But if a serious economic crisis comes it will force the government and Congress to take drastic decisions. If so, within a framework of budgetary adjustments and scarce and expensive money, we would find the US market mired in low growth and deflation.
The US is still the most important country in the world but that world is transforming at an accelerated rate. Albeit very painfully, the US will have to adapt to this new reality.
In a multilateral world, the economy and finance are global. International collaboration and co-ordination will be indispensable to face global economic challenges, especially in a renewed period of crisis. That will require a ‘new Bretton Woods’ for the 21st century and a more representative International Monetary Fund, which can assume a greater leadership role.
About Francesc Raventós
Francesc Raventós is an economist, former dean of the Official Economist Association of Spain in Madrid, deputy mayor of Barcelona and co-author of Economic and Social Strategic Plan for the future of Barcelona.
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The loss of European memory
12th February 2019
A commitment to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law was Europe’s answer to fascism.
The loss of this European memory presents real dangers
amid a resurgent populism.
The greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression (1929-1939) has produced a crisis of democratic legitimacy not unlike the one that fuelled the rise of fascism in the interwar years. During the postwar era (1945-1989) collective memories of total war—as well as the economic success of liberal democracy—ensured that neo-fascist movements remained politically marginal. However, the Great Recession (2007-13) has reinvigorated the far right as a viable political alternative. Reflecting on the present moment, China Miéville notes: ‘There has not in living memory been a better time to be a fascist. We live in a utopia : it just isn’t ours.’
Today’s neo-fascist movements in western Europe have built on the rhetoric of their predecessors in speaking of ‘taking back control’, ensuring that ‘our white race … continues to exist’ and fighting ‘an invasion of foreigners’. These political resonances, combined with similarities in structural conditions to the 1930s—a financial crisis followed by an economic collapse, leading to poverty, high unemployment and mass migration—have led to warnings of a ‘return of fascism’ and worries that we are living through a ‘new Weimar era’.
In an earlier post I focused on the role of migration and forgetting in the rise of ‘illiberal democracy’ in east-central Europe. Similar dynamics of forgetting are also present in the western part of the continent. In contrast to explanations of right-wing authoritarian populism which focus on economic or cultural factors, I argue that generational change and the loss of memory of total war in western Europe play a crucial role in the current crisis. It is not a coincidence that the populist renaissance has occurred seven decades after the end of the second world war
Memory and integration
In the aftermath of two world wars and the Holocaust, ‘never again’ was more than just a slogan: it was an imperative for political change. References to collective memories of these events played a crucial role in justifying the pooling of sovereignty through European integration. The lessons of total war also inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the creation of the Council of Europe—and hence the European Court of Human Rights and the other institutions which anchored the protection of fundamental rights in postwar European and international law.
The individuals who initiated these organisations came from the generation that had lived through Europe’s age of total war (1914-45) as adults. This cohort was followed by the ‘forty-fivers’, who came of age during the war and thus bore no responsibility for it.
They questioned the actions of their parents and the intellectual traditions of their homelands in order to come to terms with the legacy of 1945. The leaders of this generation deepened integration through the completion of the common market, the opening of intra-European borders with the Schengen agreement, the creation of the euro and the empowerment of the European Parliament.
With the turn of the second millennium the leadership of Europe has passed to a cohort with no memory of the second world war. As the generations which experienced the war have begun to pass away, so have the broader normative demands of memory they carried. Rather than a push for further integration, within this first cohort of individuals who have no personal experience of total war one finds a concentration of support for neo-fascist, authoritarian populists. The nostalgia underpinning the rise of this movement is rooted in this generation’s own memories of a better, supposedly easier life within purportedly independent nation-states during the height of western Europe’s Wirtschaftswunder (‘economic miracle’) of the trente glorieuses (the ‘glorious 30’ years from 1946 to 1975).
Yet this perception of the economically independent, politically sovereign ‘nation’ requires nation-states to ‘be imagined into periods when in fact they did not exist’. While the postwar ‘baby-boomers’ remember the national state as the locus of economic prosperity, this image is partial at best.
The economic, political and social integration of the continent was already well under way during this period, even if this was not always immediately obvious in the everyday experiences of individuals.
In fact, far from moving from empire to nation to integration over the course of the postwar period, as many Eurosceptics seem to believe, western Europe underwent a transition directly from colonialism to economic integration after 1945. The false narrative of the postwar economic boom as the heyday of the sovereign state, which Timothy Snyder refers to as ‘the fable of the wise nation’, combined with the loss of personal memories of war and suffering, poses a profound challenge to the values and institutions which previous guarded against the renewal of fascism.
Defending democracy beyond the state
Awareness of the importance of generational change and the loss of European memory in fuelling the rise of the far right is crucial for the present day. The lesson of the 1930s is that liberal democracy—a regime which protects economic, social, political and civil rights in a ‘co-original’ or ‘equi-primordial’ manner—cannot be preserved or developed via the nation-state alone. On the contrary, international institutions play a crucial role in ensuring that the potentially jingoistic general will expressed within nation-states does not trample on the rights of minorities or political dissent.
Democracy is about more than just elections and majority rule: it is about preserving the plurality of opinions as well as the respect for the rights of individuals and minorities necessary to make elections and majoritarian decision-making meaningful. The history of the 20th century shows that the ‘will of the people’ can only function properly within constrained democracies which work together to protect fundamental human rights.
An international framework for liberal democracy was the central goal of the global order created in the aftermath of the second world war. In the face of the return of fascism as a realistic political alternative to mainstream politics in western Europe, these international institutions are essential to constrain nationalistic notions of popular sovereignty—now more than ever.
About Peter Verovšek
Peter J Verovšek is an assistant professor of politics / international relations at the University of Sheffield. His work focuses on 20th-century continental political thought, critical theory, collective memory and European politics.
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¡ PELÍCULAS.... !
¡ PROGRAMA DOBLE.... !
¡ NO SE LO PIERDA.... !
morir en madrid
frédéric
rossif,1962
↑dar clic en la imagen de arriba↑
canciones para después de una guerra
basilio martín patiño, 1971
↑dar clic en la imagen de arriba↑
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